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THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT'S NEW FOUND
VIGILANCE OVER COSTLY REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE
PETROLEUM REFINING INDUSTRY: UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v. THE
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The struggle between supporters of environmental preserva-
tion and those who purportedly harm the environment through on-
going business practices has been mediated by the Environmental
Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA") and its interpretation of nu-
merous government statutes for years. EPA faces the admittedly on-
erous task of regulating business that, in the course of legitimate,
environmentally sensitive attempts to recycle or reuse discarded
materials, continue to harm the environment. Meanwhile, a critical
median between capitalism and environmental preservation lies in
the balance.
EPA, empowered by the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976 (hereinafter "RCRA"), is in charge of interpreting the
meaning of the term "solid waste" under RCRA.1 EPA promulgated
rules explaining the term "solid waste" under RCRA for the express
purpose of hazardous waste regulation. 2 More specifically, the fo-
cus of this Note and its corresponding case, American Petroleum Insti-
tute (API) v. EPA (hereinafter "API II"), outlines the method of
determining the circumstances that deem a solid waste "discarded"
and thereby subject to EPA regulation under RCRA. 3 Both the pe-
troleum refining industry and the petrochemical manufacturing in-
dustry attempted to urge EPA to exempt certain byproducts of their
on-going process of oil production, which may contain valuable in-
1. See R. Michael Sweeney, Reengineering RCRA: The Command Control Require-
ments of the Waste Disposal Paradigm of Subtitle C and the Act's Objective of Fostering
Recycling-Rethinking the Definition of Solid Waste, Again, 6 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
1, 2 (1996) (stating development of regulatory system for recycling of industrial,
commercial and municipal solid wastes is currently among most significant issues
in environmental policy arena); see also Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA) §§ 3001-5006, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1988)).
2. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per
curiam) [hereinafter API I/] (illustrating interpretation controversy of "discarded"
in context of solid waste and RCRA).
3. See id. at 65 (focusing on discard in relation to recycled oil-bearing waste-
waters from petroleum refining industry).
(269)
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gredients such as reusable oil, from the Agency's regulations.4 This
particular debate between advocates of the petroleum refining in-
dustry and EPA will surely continue in the future. As the price of
this precious commodity increases under protest around the globe,
so will the scrutiny of its industry and its production processes.
Section II of this Note encompasses the facts of API II and sets
forth the following: (1) the processes by which usable oil is ex-
tracted from oil-bearing wastewaters and petrochemical manufac-
tured oil; (2) the attendant controversy between the petroleum
refining industry and the government over the proper characteriza-
tion of the terms "solid waste" and "discarded" for purposes of
RCRA and its regulations during the recovery process; and (3) the
corresponding statutory interpretation problem hampering the pe-
trochemical refining industry.
Section III details other case law and legal materials germane
to the definition and circumstances surrounding the terms "dis-
carded material" and "solid waste." Section IV provides a descrip-
tion of the API II court's reasoning, particularly regarding the
definitions of "solid waste" and "discarded materials" under RCRA.
Section V contains a Critical Analysis of the API 11 decision. The
analysis suggests that EPA is given too much deference, and it illus-
trates this point through a careful scrutiny of arguments presented
by each of the parties. Finally, Section VI chronicles the impact of
the API HI decision and its future repercussions on the petroleum
refining industry, and the nation as a whole.
II. FACTS
In the petroleum refining industry, refineries attempt to "re-
move impurities" and isolate hydrocarbon fractions from crude oil
feedstock.5 These refineries use massive amounts of water; the was-
tewaters generated thereafter contain a "small" percentage of
4. See id. at 55. EPA's initial stance in 1988 excluded oil-bearing wastewaters
from the purview of RCRA. See id. (citing Identification and Listing of Hazardous
Waste: Amendments to Definition of Solid Waste, 53 Fed. Reg. 519, 525-26
(1988)). In 1994, however, EPA changed its mind and held that even before the
oil-bearing wastewater undergoes "primary treatment," or the process by which
salvageable oil is recovered from the wastewaters, this byproduct (wastewater) is
deemed solid waste and subject to RCRA regulations. See API II, 216 F.3d at 55
(citing 59 Fed.Reg. 38,540/1). For an in depth discussion about the process of
"primary treatment" see infra, notes 7- 8 and accompanying text.
5. See API II, 216 F.3d at 55 (quoting Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 42,113/3-
42,115/1,42, 121/2).
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residual oil.6 Petroleum refineries ultimately discharge the oil-bear-
ing wastewater, but only after they implement a three-step process. 7
The most notable step in this three-step process is called "primary
treatment," which removes certain materials, especially potentially
reusable oil. This procedure has two beneficiary consequences:
"(1) it meets a Clean Water Act requirement that refineries remove
oil from their wastewater, and (2) it allows refineries to recover a
not insignificant quantity of oil. .. "8
In sharp contrast to petroleum refiners, petrochemical manu-
facturers do not refine crude oil. 9 Rather, these manufacturers use
refined petroleum products and other feedstocks "to produce pe-
6. See API II, 216 F.3d at 55. This by-product, known as oil-bearing wastewater,
is the substance at issue in this Casenote. At this point in the oil recovery process,
the wastewater has not yet been treated to reclaim any reusable oil. See id. The
controversy between EPA and the petroleum refining industry leaders centers on
the fact that EPA earmarked the wastewater as "solid waste" under RCRA, even
before any reusable oil could be extracted from the oil-bearing wastewaters. See
Solid Waste Disposal Act, §§ 1004(5)(B), 3001(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(27).
In its brief to this case, EPA attempted to put the ratio of water used in the
primary treatment process into perspective: "While the oil content of the typical
feedstock used in various refining steps is higher than 99% (greater than 990,000
parts per million).., refinery wastewater contains about one hundred-thousandth of
the oil." Brief for Petitioner at 23, American Petroleum Inst. v. United States EPA,
No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000).
7. See API II, 216 F.3d at 54 (providing illustration of primary treatment and
its effects, both on oil industry and EPA). Following the primary treatment stage,
"which removes solid pollutants," biological treatments called secondary treatment
and filtration or other "polishing steps, otherwise known as "tertiary treatment" are
performed. Brief for Respondent at 9, American Petroleum Inst. v. United States
EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000) (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 46,434,
46436/3 (Oct. 18, 1982))(expounding technological foundation of rule). Primary
treatment "typically occurs in tanks." Joint Final Brief of Petitioners at 9, American
Petroleum Inst. v. United States EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000).
8. API II, 216 F.3d at 55. Additionally, the amount of oil that is recovered by
primary treatment and recycled back into the "refinery production process" was
stated in API H as 1,000 barrels per day across the industry. See id. The sole pur-
pose of primary treatment, according to EPA, "is to treat plant wastewater so that it
can be discarded pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Brief for Respondent
at 10, American Petroleum Inst. v. United States EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed
Feb. 25, 2000). EPA also stated in its brief that "numerous types of industries treat
their wastewaters (including those containing oil) using these treatment stages to
comply with the CWA." Id. (citing American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d
284, 293 (3d Cir. 1977) and NRDC v. EPA, 790 F.2d 289, 293 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1986)).
9. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per
curiam). Petrochemical recovered oil differs from oil recovered from the petro-
leum refining industry in that "it can be contaminated with hazardous constituents
and hazardous wastes that neither come from the petroleum refining process no
are capable of being refined." Final Brief for Respondent at 11, American Petro-
leuim Inst. v. United States EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000) (citing
63 Fed. Reg. at 42,130).
2001]
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trochemical products such as organic chemicals."'10 As with primary
treatment, these production processes have a tendency to produce
residual oil, otherwise known as "petrochemical recovered oil."'"
This oil, a by-product, can be reintroduced into the petroleum re-
fining process as well. 12
Initially, EPA proposed to shield oil-bearing wastewaters from
the broad, sweeping definition of solid waste contemplated by
RCRA.' 3 However, in 1994 and 1998, EPA investigated various pro-
duction processes in the petroleum refining industry and reviewed
the feasibility of excluding from the definition of solid waste "two
secondary materials: oil-bearing wastewaters generated by the petro-
leum refining industry and recovered oil produced by the pe-
trochemical refining industry."'14  Moreover, another statutory
interpretation by EPA seemed impending.
In API II, EPA ruled that oil-bearing wastewaters, before the
primary treatment process has begun, constitute "solid waste" for
the purposes of RCRA regulation.' 5 Additionally, EPA ruled that
recovered oil from petrochemical facilities escapes the broad net of
the "solid waste" definition if certain specified conditions are met.1 6
The District of Columbia remanded the portion of the API II deci-
10. API II, 216 F.3d at 58 (contrasting petroleum refining industry with pe-
trochemcial refining industry).
11. See id. (citing Final Rule, 63 Fed.Reg. at 42,114 n.2).
12. See id. (comparing petrochemcial manufacturing to petroleum refining).
13. See API II , 216 F.3d at 55 (explaining EPA's rationale for scrutinizing
primary treatment of oil-bearing wastewater); for a further discussion of API 11 see
supra note 4. EPA continually emphasized that only a small percentage of oil is
recovered from primary treatment. See id. However, EPA provided no empirical
evidence in support of this assertion. See id.
14. Id., at 54. The API II court stated that the reason EPA decided to re-ex-
amine the production process of the petroleum refining industry was "in pursuit of
its RCRA obligations." Id.
15. See API II, 216 F.3d at 55 (failing to distinguish between downstream and
upstream oil recovery units central to Industry Petitioner's rebuttal regarding sali-
ency of primary treatment). In its Final Joint Brief to the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals, API maintained that "only .., in-process, oil-bearing was-
tewaters that are part of a continuous, ongoing oil recovery upstream of oil recov-
ery units should be excluded. API has never contested that wastewaters
downstream of oil-recovery and being treated for discharge are solid wastes." Final
Joint Brief of Petitioners, supra note 7, at 8.
16. See API II, 216 F.3d at 55 (citing Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 42, 128-30 &
C.F.R. § 261.4(a) (12),(18)). CMA contended that the petrochemical recovered oil
is not discarded at all, and therefore it challenged "EPA's decisions in 1985 to
regulate, and 1994 and 1998 to continue regulating, petrochemical recovered oil as
solid waste simply because it is used to produce fuels." Final Brief for Petitioners,
supra notes 7 at 2. CMA alleged that petrochemical recovered oil is carefully moni-
tored because "99% of its feedstock consists of hydrocarbons that serve a useful
function in the manufacturing of fuels." Id.
4
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss2/3
AMERICAN PETROLEUM
sion that dealt with the oil-bearing wastewaters because EPA ne-
glected to provide a complete explanation of its decision not to
exclude the wastewaters from RCRA. 17 As a principal of the pe-
trochemical manufacturing industry, the Chemical Manufacturers
Association (hereinafter "CMA") filed a petition in API // arguing
that EPA "has no authority to regulate any petrochemical recovered
oil under any circumstances because such materials are not 'dis-
carded."'" 8 The API I court denied CMA's petition as to pe-
trochemical recovered oil.19 The American Petroleum Institute
("API"), CMA and Texaco, Inc. (collectively, "Industry Petitioners")
appealed both of these decisions. 20
III. BACKGROUND
A. General Overview of Strict RCRA Regulation
Some commentators lament the undervaluation of recycled
used oil in the marketplace, both in its dollars and cents value and
in its value to the sensitive environment. 21 Various Congressional
members also adhere to this position. 2 2 California Congressman
Esteban E. Torres detailed the numerous costs to society and the
environment for improperly disposed used oil.23 For example, im-
17. See API II, 216 F.3d at 58. It has been held that an agency must fully
articulate an explanation for its actions which include a "rational connection be-
tween the facts found and the choice made." Id. at 56 (citing Motor Vehicles Mfrs.
Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
18. Id. at 59 (outlining CMA's argument against EPA regulation based on
plain meaning of "discarded").
19. See API II, 216 F.3d at 59 (rejecting CMA's argument outright).
20. See id. at 55. On the issue of the oil-bearing wastewaters, the API II court
remanded that portion of the case in order to give EPA the opportunity to proffer
a reasonable explanation for its rule-making. See id. at 58. APIIIdid not suggest a
particular result on remand. See id.
21. See generally, Used Oil Energy Production Act: Hearing on S. 2631 Before the
Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., 102d Cong. 13 (1992)(statement of Es-
teban E. Torres of California) (observing "the market value of collected used oil
does not reflect social or external cost to society of failing to recycle that oil").
22. See id. In 1992, the Honorable Esteban E. Torres, a representative from
California, stated before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, that
"the market value of collected used oil does not reflect social or external cost to
society of failing to recycle that oil." Id.
23. See id. Representative Torres focused on lubricating oil, and he failed to
address the petroleum refining industry specifically. See id. However, due to the
poignant perspectives that Representative Torres offered, and due to the absence
of any industry-specific limitation placed on his remarks, they have been included
as part of this Casenote to provide context. See generally, id. at 12-15.
2732001]
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properly disposed oil "often finds its way into our lakes and streams
and even into our drinking water supplies." 24
Additionally, if used oil is disposed of improperly, it contrib-
utes to mounting clean-up costs at landfill sites and to the amount
of airborne lead pollution that fills the skies every year.25 The pri-
mary treatment process attempts to alleviate some of these dangers
by recapturing some of the used oil before the wastewater is "ulti-
mately discharged. ' 26 Proponents of EPA and its regulatory effects,
promulgated through RCRA, attempted to present an equally per-
suasive argument: the oil-bearing wastewaters, even before primary
treatment, are "solid wastes," which could be further categorized as
hazardous waste that pose substantial risks not only toward the nat-
ural environment through contamination, but also toward the
health of human beings. 27 The resulting contention by EPA was,
and continues to be, that strict regulation of this used oil by-prod-
uct is justified from an environmentally conscious point of view.
Compliance with environmental regulations has dramatically
increased business costs in the petroleum refining industry over the
last decade.28 In 1996 alone, the environmental expenditures of
the petroleum industry allocated 8.2 billion dollars, which
24. Id. Two million gallons of drinking water can be contaminated by one
quart of used oil discarded improperly. See Used Oil Energy Production Act: Hearing
on S. 2631 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., 102d Cong. 13 (1992).
25. See id. at 14. In fact, as of 1992, fifty-three Superfund sites have been iden-
tified as sources of used oil contamination. See id. Lead emitted from improperly
disposed used oil accounts for 600,000 pounds of airborne pollution every year. See
id.
26. See API II, 216 F.3d at 55 (discussing goals of primary treatment process).
27. See id. at 59. Section 3001 (e) (2) of RCRA requires EPA to decide whether
petroleum refining wastes, in this case oil-beaing wastewaters, should be listed as
hazardous wastes. See Final Brief for Respondent at 15, American Petroleum Inst.
v. United States EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 6921(e) (2)). The statutory standard to classify a waste as hazardous, embodied
by EPA, is whether that particular waste presents "substantial present or potential
hazard for human health or the environment." Id. at 3. On the other hand, pro-
ponents of the petroleum refining industry argue hazardous waste classification is
a formality; "[r]egulations and administration of regulations should focus on true
environmental protection, reducing actual risk to actual people . . . rather than
record keeping and reporting that add cost without providing real benefits." Issues
Affecting the Refining Sector of the Petroleum Industry: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Energy and Natural Res., 102d Cong. 161 (1999) (statements ofJ.C. Klasing, General
Manager, Environmental Affairs and Safety, AMOCO Oil Company).
28. See State of the Petroleum Industry: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy
and Natural Res., 106th Cong. 17 (1999) (containing statement of Senator Kent
Conrad from North Dakota). Various circuits have held that "neither impossibility
nor good faith efforts to secure financial assurances are defenses to liability ...
under RCRA." United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 38 F.3d 862, 866 (7th Cir.
1995) (citing United States v. Production Plated Plastics, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 956 (D.
Mich. 1990)).
6
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amounted to approximately one-fourth of the net income of the
top 200 oil and natural gas companies. 29 This amounts to eighty-
three dollars per U.S. household.3 0 Since the 1970s, the federal
government has enacted ten laws "that impact the petroleum refin-
ing industry." 1 This figure does not consider: (1) the numerous
regulations attached to these laws; and (2) the laws and regulations
passed by the individual states. 32 Petroleum industry leaders main-
tain that the laws and regulations should take into account "the cost
of compliance and the benefits derived from society."33
B. Interpretation and Application of RCRA Statutes and
Definitions
In 1994, EPA contemplated regualting wastewaters under
RCRA because "even before the oil is recovered in primary treat-
ment," the wastewaters are discarded materials and hence "solid
wastes" subject to regulation. 34 When a byproduct, such as oil-bear-
ing wastewaters or petrochemical recovered oil, is discarded, EPA
considers it "solid waste" under RCRA. However, this is a heated
debate between the Industry Petitioners and EPA.35
29. See State of the Petroleum Industry: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy
and Natural Res., 106th Cong. 117 (1999) (citing Petroleum Industry Environmental
Performance Sixth Annual Report by the American Petroleum Institute (citation omit-
ted)) (providing costs of EPA regulation on petroleum refining industry). The
$8.2 billion figure was more than EPA's entire budget for that year. See id.
30. See id. (calling for common sense environmental laws and regulations).
31. Id. at 117.
32. See id. (outlining problems with numerous EPA regulations).
33. State of the Petroleum Industry: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, 106th Cong. 117 (1999) (containing various excerpts of con-
gressional testimony from both political officials and members of private
businesses).
34. API II, 216 F.3d at 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (discussing EPA's
consideration in adopting "1994 Rule which determined that oil-bearing waste-
waters are solid waste for purposes of RCRA"). See id. at 55.
35. See id. at 54. Industry Petitioners were careful to point out that the term
"wastewater" does mean that oil-bearing wastewaters are RCRA "solid wastes." See
Joint Final Brief of Petitioners at 3, n.1, American Petroleum Inst. v. United States
EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000). A key House Committee Report
cited by Industry Petitioners stated that "[w]aste itself is a misleading word in the
context of the committee's activities.Much industrial and agricultural waste is re-
claimed or put to new use and is therefore not part of the discarded materials problem
that the committee addresses." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1491 at 2 (1976)).
2001]
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1. Statutory Layout
a. Oil-bearing wastewaters
RCRA delegated to EPA the statutory power to regulate hazard-
ous wastes and solid wastes. 36 The definition of solid waste is set
forth in Subtitle D of RCRA, which bestows less restrictive manage-
ment constraints and standards upon material conforming to this
broad definition. 37 In the context of RCRA, Congress defined solid
waste as:
"[A]ny garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment
plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution con-
trol facility and other discarded material, including solid,
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural op-
erations, and from community activities .... ,8
Additionally, EPA defined solid waste for the "purposes of its haz-
ardous waste regulations" as "any discarded material."39 Taken a
step further, "discarded material," in the context of RCRA, means
36. See Connecticut Coastal Fisherman's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 989
F.2d 1305, 1314 (2nd Cir. 1993) (holding lead shot and clay targets deposited on
land and in water incident to normal operation of gun club were solid waste under
RCRA and its regulations).
37. See API II, 216 F.3d at 54 (showing materials classified under Subtitle C,
such as "hazardous wastes" are under more demanding management schedules
than materials classified under Subtitle D).
38. See Connecticut Coastal, 989 F.2d at 1314. The EPA has created "a dichot-
omy of the definition of solid waste." Id. Regulations encompassing the identifica-
tion and listing of hazardous wastes "include[s] a definition of solid waste that
applies only to wastes that are also hazardous for purposes [of subtitle C of
RCRA]." Military Toxics Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (provid-
ing "intended use" defense against enforcement of RCRA by EPA). "Solid waste is
by statute defined broadly as any discarded material; by regulation, however, solid
waste for the purposes of Subtitle C includes only discarded material that has been
abandoned in certain ways .. " Id. at 951. This analysis is illustrative of the com-
plexity of the statutory interpretation at issue.
39. API II, 216 F.3d at 54 (citing 42 U.S.C.§ 6903(27)). RCRA provides for a
"cradle to grave" regulatory structure for the "treatment, storage and disposal of
solid and hazardous wastes." Connecticut Coastal, 989 F.2d at 1313. But see Gaba,
Solid waste and Recycled Materials under RCRA: Separating Chaff from Wheat, 16 EcoL-
oGY L.Q. 623, 651 (1989) (calling RCRA "deathbed to grave" statute because of
difficulty in ascertaining when material is dead for purposes of RCRA). The analy-
sis begins with a determination that a substance is a solid waste because under
RCRA, hazardous wastes are a "subset" of solid wastes. Id. As a result, in order for
a waste to be classified as hazardous, it must first qualify as a solid waste for the
purposes of RCRA. See id. (citing United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 716 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
[Vol. XII: p. 269
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss2/3
AMERICAN PETROLEUM
any material "which is abandoned, recycled, or considered inher-
ently waste-like." 40
b. Petrochemical recovered oil
Concerned that a broad exclusion for petrochemical recovered
oil under the ambit of RCRA would encourage "sham recycling,"
EPA enacted a regulation that excluded petrochemical oil from the
definition of solid waste only if certain conditions are met.4 1 "Sham
recycling" is the prohibited disposal of waste through "adultera-
tion. ' 42 For these situations, EPA crafted a rule that excluded from
its solid waste definition "petrochemical recovered oil . . . to be in-
serted into the petroleum refining process . . . along with normal
refinery process streams, provided [that] [t]he oil is hazardous only
because it exhibits the characteristic of ignitability. . . .-4 Pe-
trochemical recovered oil that is inherently hazardous, due to the
presence of other hazardous materials in its composition, is not ex-
cluded from the definition of solid waste. 44 Furthermore, as a tenet
of EPA's goal of curbing "sham recycling," petrochemical oil that is
"speculatively accumulated before being recycled into the petro-
40. API II, 216 F.3d at 58. A further refining of solid waste yields the defini-
tion of hazardous waste under RCRA: "Hazardous waste is... solid waste that: (A)
cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in seri-
ous irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness; or (B) pose substantial present
or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed." Final Brief for Re-
spondent at 4, American Petroleum Inst. v. United States EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C.
Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000).
41. See API II, 216 F.3d at 58. In other words, these "conditions" prevent the
exclusion of oil that contains "non-refinable hazardous materials." Id.; see also,
Cathy Landry, Rehearing Sought on Refinery Waste Case, PLRATr'S OILGRAM NEWS,
Sept.14, 2000, at 2.
42. See API II, 216 F.3d at 58; see also United States v. Marine Shale Processors,
81 F.3d 1361, 1365 (5th Cir. 1996) (examining whether shale processing company
engaged in sham recycling of contaminated soil or used soil as legitimate ingredi-
ent in production of product).
43. Id. (citing Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 42,185 (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.4(a) (18) (i)). Ignitability and benzene toxicity characteristics are normal to
basic petroleum feedstocks; therefore EPA allowed materials to still be excluded if
they possessed only these properties. See Fed. Reg. at 42,130/1.
44. See API II, 216 F.3d at 58-59. Industry Petitioners stated, "[i]ssues pertain-
ing to environmental harm may be central to deciding which solid wastes warrant
regulation as hazardous wastes, but they have no bearing at all on whether the
material in question has been discarded." Joint Brief of Petitioners at 24, Ameri-
can Petroleum Inst. v. United States EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25,
2000). A consultation to RCRA supports Petitioners' proposition: "RCRA defines
a hazardous waste as a solid waste which ... may (B) pose a substantial present or
potential hazard to human health or the environment." Id. at 24, n.84 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 6903(5)).
2001]
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leum refining process" is not excluded from the definition of solid
waste.4
5
C. Case Law Illustrations and Chevron Statutory Analysis
1. Multiple Interpretations of "Discarded"
The Industry Petitioners' case revolved around the varied in-
terpretations of the term "discarded" in the language and structure
of RCRA.46 Starting in 1987, EPA's definition of "solid waste" and
"discarded" were dissected in three major cases brought before the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia.4 7 These three cases and their progeny unfortunately failed to
clarify (1) the RCRA definition of "solid waste," and (2) when a
recyclable material "becomes a solid waste under the RCRA." 4"
This controversy and its ambiguity continues today.
a. 'Discarded" conforms to its plain meaning
The seminal case regarding the definition of "solid waste" is
American Mining Congress v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency (hereinafter "AMC I"). 49 Interpretation of congressional in-
45. API II, 216 F.3d at 59. CMA argued API 11 held EPA has no authority to
regulate the petrochemical recovered oil under any circumstances because the
materials at issue in the case were not discarded. See id. For a further discussion of
this issue, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
46. See API II, 216 F.3d at 59 (illustrating complexity of interpretations of dis-
carded). Compare Sweeney, supra note 1, at 21 (stating "The wild goose chase
through the labyrinthine maze of jurisdictional triggers and carveouts under the'
definition of solid waste regulations has had an impact beyond the regulated com-
munity."), with Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Energy, 734 F. Supp. 946, 947-
952 (D. Colo. 1990) (critiquing Department of Energy attempts to recover pluto-
nium which ultimately was regulated by EPA).
Sierra Club held that neither "the hazardous waste nor the plutonium mixed
with it is destined for immediate reuse and neither passes in a continuous stream
or flow from one production process to another." Id. at 950. This mixed waste was
finally "stored for incineration that allows the ultimate recovery of plutonium." Id.
(citing American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1987));
see also, API II, 216 F.3d at 50. For a further discussion of this issue see supra note
45 and accompanying text (discussing CMA's assertion that materials were not
discarded).
47. See Sweeney, supra note 1, at 21. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit "has expressed its astonishment, displeasure, and sheer beftid-
dlement at interpreting ... solid waste . . .under RCRA regulations." Id. at 21.
48. See id. at 28 (describing reasons why ambiguity surrounding RCRA terms
continues),
49. See American Mining Cong. v. United States EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1186
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (drawing legal boundary between when spent materials generated
from petroleum refining were discarded and thus solid wastes, and when they were
recycled) (hereinafter "AMC I"); see also, Ass'n of Battery Recyclers v. EPA, 208 F.3d
1047, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming AMCIby holding some mineral processing
secondary materials destined for reuse as part of continuous industrial process is
10
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tent played a significant role in the AMC I decision. This is evi-
denced by the D.C. Circuit's repeated references to the legislative
history and Congress' reasoning behind the term "discarded mate-
rial," as well as "adherence to the statutory interpretation principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. (hereinafter "Chevron"). "50
In AMC I, the challenge to EPA's authority liad in the conten-
tion that in-process secondary materials are outside the boundaries
of the Agency's regulations. 51 The materials were not solid waste
subject to RCRA scrutiny because these particular materials were
not discarded.52 The District of Columbia Circuit expressly limited
EPA's authority to regulate those materials that are "discarded," or
"disposed of, thrown away, or abandoned" - a definition which
parallels the ordinary, plain-English meaning of "discarded".53 Sec-
ondary materials that are "recycled and reused in an on-going man-
ufacturing process or industrial process within the generating
industry itself need not be regulated as 'solid waste'." 54 As a result,
not thrown away or abandoned and immune from EPA regulation). But see United
States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1361, 1366 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding haz-
ardous waste is not employed as "ingredient" in on-going production process if it
contributes in no legitimate way to production).
50. AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1182. The court in AMC I observed that a concrete
definition of "discarded" did not exist. See id. Therefore, the court turned to a case
that revealed the general framework for analyzing agency interpretations of stat-
utes. See id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Chevron
embodied a two-step process: (1) "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter ... [and] the court ... must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress"; or (2) where Congress's intent is not elucidated, the
question for the presiding court is "whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute ... [and] a court may not substitute its own
construction ... for a reasonable interpretation." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837, 84244
(1984) (discussing how Agency could define statutory source for purposes of Clean
Air Act).
51. SeeAMC1, 824 F.2d at 1183. The processes referred to in AMC Iare petro-
leum refining and extractive metallurgy operations. See Sweeney, supra note 1, at
22.
52. See AMC 1, 824 F.2d at 1183. The AMC I court recognized a distinct differ-
ence between "discarding and ultimate recycling.., and a continuous or on-going
manufacturing process with one-site recycling." Id. at 1180.
53. Id. at 1184 (advocating everyday use of term "discarded"). AMC I also
discussed congressional intent as well as the plain meaning of the word "dis-
carded." Id. at 1185. The congressional intent that the AMC Icourt attempted to
unravel was whether Congress meant for the open-ended definition of "discarded"
to encompass readily recyclable materials through immediate reuse in an indus-
try's on-going production process. See id.
54. Sweeney, supra note 1, at 21 (emphasis added); see also, AMC I, 824 F.2d at
1185. Regulating these materials would directly controvert the goals of both the
states and Congress by restricting alternative disposal methods of solid waste. See
id. at 1186. The court in AMCI, however, has drawn criticism from commentators
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AMC I ruled that these materials were not truly discarded, hence
they are "not part of the waste disposal problem. '55
b. "Indisputably discarded": expansion of RCRA's regulatory
reach
In 1990, the decision in American Petroleum Institute v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter "API I") repre-
sented an expansion of the breadth of RCRA regulation.56 At issue
in API I was "the use of land treatment as a method of pre-treat-
ment for K061 slag [a by-product of production] generated from
primary steel production prior to recycling or reuse in the smelting
process." 57 This process is distinguishable from the process de-
scribed in AMC I in that the K061 slag present in API I was: (1)
placed on land; (2) pre-treated in preparation of recycling; and (3)
transported to a distinct reclamation facility.58 The AMC I court
held that the K061 slag was "undisputedly discarded since placing
it on the land prior to recovery operations presented a serious
threat of land contamination and ... contributed to the waste dis-
posal problem."5 9 The K061 slag was "indisputably discarded"
because it "never indicated that it understood EPA's rationale for regulating recycl-
able materials as solid waste." Gaba supra note 39, at 651.
55. Sweeney, supra note 1, at 21. In contrast, the dissent of AMC largued that
RCRA's functional approach towards the term "disposal" suggested that RCRA was
intended to be read more open-ended than the plain-meaning, narrower explana-
tion of "discarded," espoused by the majority, and ultimately accepted by the AMC
I court. See AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1196 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
56. See American Petroleum Inst. v. United States EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 732
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (expounding scope of RCRA regulation) (hereinafter "API I").
57. Sweeney, supra note 1, at 23. The slag was originally generated in electric
arc furnaces; it was neither reclaimed nor recycled "in an ongoing process within
the generating industry itself." Id. "Slag," as used here, is the residue produced
from smelting metal-laden wastes. See id. at n. 154.
58. See id at 23. The fact that the slag was land treated troubled EPA, and it
held a heavy hand in the court's reasoning.See id. In the 1984 amendments to
RCRA, Congress switched the focus of hazardous waste management away from
land disposal and towards other treatment alternatives because "[c]ertain classes of
land disposal facilities are not capable of assuring long-term containment of cer-
tain hazardous wastes, and to avoid substantial risk.., reliance on land disposal
should be minimized or eliminated .. " API 1, 906 F.2d at 733.
59. API/, 906 F.2d at 741 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The term "expansion" referred to
in the subtitle of this'section of the Note is symbolic of the fact that after API I in
1990, "RCRAjurisdiction ... included all discarded materials, except those subject
to reclamation in an on-going manufacturing process within the generating indus-
try itself." Sweeney, supra note 1, at 23; cf Connecticut Coastal, 989 F.2d at 1316
(explaining used clay targets from firing range were discarded). Connecticut Coastal
presented an interesting divergence and is noted for its use of the "normal tise of
product" rationale. Id. at 1313. Remington, a gun club, contended that RCRA did
not apply because the disposal of the clay targets on the range was "merely inciden-
tal to the use of a product." Id. However, after almost seventy years of use, as
12
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before the metal reclamation process because the metal was left to
lay on the land for a period of time.60 In contrast, the materials
profiled in AMC Iwere destined for beneficial use and did not con-
tribute to the waste disposal problem because these materials were
reused in a continuous process by the generating industry itself.6'
The District of Columbia Circuit also distinguished API I from
AMC I by highlighting the fact that when the K061 slag was deliv-
ered to the reclamation facility, it was not part of an "ongoing man-
ufacturing or industrial process within the generating industry," but
was "part of a mandatory waste treatment plan proscribed by the
EPA."' 62 The metal slag retained its solid waste status within the con-
fines of the reclamation facility.63 As a result, the metal slag re-
mained within EPA's regulatory reach because it was "solid waste"
considered "sludge from a waste treatment plant."64
c. Further regulation of discarded materials based on the
AMC I ruling; land disposal units of wastewater
treatment plants no longer immune from RCRA
In American Mining Congress v. United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (hereinafter "AMC II"), the D.C. Circuit further refined
its holding in AMC I to include secondary materials managed in
much as 2,400 tons of lead from discharges (or five million pounds) and eleven
million pounds of clay target pieces were scattered on the property around the
Club and in the nearby waters of Long Island Sound. See id. The Connecticut
Coastal court concluded that the lead shot and clay targets piled up long enough to
be considered solid waste under the statutory definition. See Connecticut Coastal, 989
F.2d at 1315; see also, Catellus Dev. Corp. v. General Auto., 34 F.3d 748, 752 (9th
Cir. 1994) (aligning with Eleventh Circuit in Ilco in holding that lead components
from spent batteries are solid waste because they retained their character as waste
throughout); cf. United States v. Wedzeb Enter., Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1328, 1335
(S.D. Ind. 1994) (holding "[i] t is the worthlessness of an object that makes it refuse
or garbage").
60. See API I, 906 F.2d at 741; see generally, Sweeney, supra note 1, at 23. Subti-
tle C of RCRA has established a requisite that one of two preconditions to a haz-
ardous waste being disposed of on land must be met; "(1) the Administrator of the
EPA determines, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that there will be no migra-
tion of hazardous constituents from the disposal units . . . or (2) the waste is
treated to meet standards established by EPA .... API 1, 906 F.2d at 729 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 6924(d), (e), (g) & (m)).
61. See API , 906 F.2d at 741. The court also dismissed as "immaterial" the
Industry Petitioners' notion in AMC I that the method of waste treatment ex-
tracted something of value, and therefore, should be immune from regulation as
hazardous waste. See id. at 741, n.16.
62. Id. (stating K061 slag was not part of on-going manufacturing process,
distinguishing API I from AMC 1).
63. See id. (listing alterative reasoning for EPA regulation of slag).
64. API , 906 F.2d at 741 (giving EPA's reasons for regulation of metal slag).
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land disposal units as "discarded."65 Petitioners' main contention
in AMC II was that the sludges from primary smelting operations
were stored in surface impoundments that evaded RCRA regulation
due to the possibility of reclamation "some time in the future .... "66
In an attempt to bolster its claim, the petitioners in AMC Hinvoked
the D.C. Circuit's decision in AMC I, in that materials destined for
reuse could not be regulated by RCRA. EPA argued, however, that
its jurisdiction is not innocuous because "the wastes at issue in this
case, which are managed in land disposal units that are part of the
wastewater treatment systems, which have become 'part of the waste
disposal problem and which are not part of [an] ongoing industrial
process' supported EPA's position.6 7 Thus, AMC II subjected
materials to EPA regulation due to the amount of time the waste
was left on land, regardless of the materials' inherent ability to be
reused someday in the industry.
As a result of these cases, one thing is clear: materials destined
for "immediate reuse in another phase of the industry's ongoing
production process are not RCRA solid wastes." 68 The main contro-
versy, still in existence today, is the ambiguous definition of "solid
waste" and the attendant determination of when a solid waste is
discarded. Although AMC I laid "broad strokes that illustrate the
circumstances under which recycled secondary materials are by def-
65. See American Mining Cong. v. United States EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1186
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (hereinafter "AMC II") (holding specific time period did not pre-
vent sludge from being be discarded even though possibility of reuse).
66. Id. Smelting operations use surface impoundments "to collect, treat and
dispose" of wastewater; and as an indirect side effect, they "continuously produce
sludges, which precipitate from the wastewater." Id. The three wastes at issue in
this case are K064, K065 and K066, which petitioners claim are not "solid waste."
Id.; see also, Owen Elec. Steel Co. of S.C. v. Browner, 37 F.3d 146 (4th Cir.
1994) (concluding slag that lays dormant for six-months before reuse in another
capacity is discarded).
67. AMC II, 907 F.2d at 1186; see also, United States v. Ilco, Inc., 996 F.2d 1126
(11th Cir. 1993) (declining to exempt from RCRA regulation lead parts which had
been reclaimed from spent car and truck batteries for recycling purposes). In
1986, the number of vehicle batteries which become useless was approximately
70,000,000. See United States v. Ilco, Inc., 996 F.2d at 1128. The fIco court added
to the interpretation of congressional intent behind RCRA by stating that "[i]t is
perfectly reasonable for EPA to assume Congress meant 'discarded once."' Id. at
1132.
68. Sweeney, supra note 1, at 25 (stating development of regulatory system for
recycling of industrial, commercial and municipal solid wastes currently among
most significant issues in environmental policy arena); see also, Ilco v. EPA, 996
F.2d 1126 (l1th Cir. 1993)(holding discarded automobile batteries do not lose
characteristic as discarded even though reclaimer has found value in its compo-
nents); cf RSR Corp. v. Avanti Dev., Inc., No. 95-1359-C-M/S, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20424, at *12 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 20, 1999) (addressing useful product defense).
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inition solid wastes," APIIand AMC H!place some restrictive caveats
to the broad foundation laid by AMC L69
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Foundation Laid by APII Court
The D.C. Circuit in APII faced the crucial determination of
whether an industrial byproduct may be characterized as either
"discarded" or "in-process" material, and thus may be regulated
under RCRA as solid waste. 70 More specifically, EPA considered
whether to exclude from the revisited description of solid waste two
secondary materials: (1) oil-bearing wastewaters generated by the
petroleum refining industry; and (2) recovered oil produced by the
petrochemical manufacturing industry.7 1 After setting forth the rel-
evant statutory provisions pertaining to this issue, the API 1I court
dealt with each of the byproducts in kind.72
B. Oil-Bearing Wastewaters
The API H court began by providing a comprehensive analysis
of the process by which oil-bearing wastewaters were generated,
called primary treatment.73 Although reusable oil is recaptured
from wastewater that would otherwise be discarded, the District of
Columbia Circuit presented both the Industry Petitioners' argu-
ments and EPA's arguments regarding the possible regulation of
the oil-bearing wastewater.7 4 The main disagreement between the
two sides, as cited by the API court was the point at which these
wastewaters "become discarded for purposes of the solid waste defi-
nition."7 5 The query was whether discarding of the wastewater hap-
pened "before the primary treatment process, allowing regulation
of wastewater as solid waste at that point," or at the end of the pri-
mary treatment process, when the oil from the wastewaters was al-
ready recovered for further use.76
69. Sweeney, supra note 1, at 25 (describing restrictive covenants placed upon
reading of AMC 1).
70. See API II, 216 F.3d at 50 (dealing with central issue of Note).
71. See id. at 54 (noting issues EPA considered for exclusion from final
regulation).
72. See id. at 55-56 (expounding upon issues EPA considered during exclusion
process).
73. See id. at 55 (noting process generating oil-bearing wastewaters).
74. See API II, 216 F.3d at 55 (granting EPA deference rule-making process).
75. Id. (illustrating absence of bright-line point of when byproduct is
discarded).
76. Id. The court stated that "no one disputes that the discard. of the oil-
bearing wastewater "has certainly occurred" toward the later portions of treatment.
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The APII court was guided by a number of different factors in
its holding regarding the oil-bearing wastewaters. 77 Chief among
these factors were the three previous cases that discussed this same
topic, namely AMC /78 The Industry Petitioners grounded their ar-
gument in the fact that oil-bearing wastewaters were not solid waste
because AMC I already declared that "in-process secondary materi-
als are not discarded" and accordingly, may not regulate them. 79
However, the D.C. court also -elucidated its prior holding in AMC I,
by proscribing a more narrow reading of that opinion.80 According
to the D.C. Circuit, AMC I did not address the discard status of any
of the specific materials contained in the briefs; rather, it held only
that the wastewaters, taken as a whole, were part of an on-going
production process and therefore immune from RCRA
regulation.8'
Using the Chevron standard enunciated in AMC H to analyze
whether EPA may regulate an industrial by-product as solid waste,
the APIII court initially gave EPA's decision deference.8 2 However,
the API II court also recognized EPA's rule-making power did not
come automatically.8 3 The D.C. Circuit in API cited EPA's inabil-
ity to "balance the costs and benefits of primary treatment," which
forced the D.C. Circuit to recognize that "because the agency has
failed to provide a rational explanation for its decision ... the deci-
sion [was] arbitrary and capricious."8 4 Consequently, the API H
court vacated that portion of EPA's decision and declined to ex-
Id. The court failed to elaborate on the later phases of the primary treatment
process it referred to in that statement. See id.
77. See API II, 216 F.3d at 56-57 (accepting EPA view that scant amount of oil
is recovered in primary treatment).
78. See id. (citing chiefly three cases, namely AMC I, AMC II, and API 1).
79. Id. at 56 (citing ruling of AMC Iwith authority).
80. See id. at 56 (distinguishing oil-bearing wastewaters from materials de-
scribed in AMC I).
81. See API II, 216 F.3d at 50, 56 (clarifying on-going production process).
82. See id. (citing American Mining Cong. v. United States EPA, 907 F.2d
1179, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). The court in APIIIalso admitted that prior cases
attempting to decide when "discard" occurred have been unable to draw a clear
line, although AMC II may have been the closest case to doing so. See id. For a
more complete discussion of the circumstances and holding of AMC II, see supra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
83. See API II, 216 F.3d at 57 (citing importance of agency interpretation
guidelines regarding statutes provided by Chevron).
84. Id. More specifically, the court in API needed obvious proof, contained in
the record, that "EPA engaged in reasoned decision-making to decide which char-
acterization is appropriate. The record . . . [was] deficient in that regard." Id.
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clude oil-bearing wastewaters from the statutory definition of solid
waste; and they remanded for further proceedings. 85
C. Petrochemical Recovered Oil
EPA promulgated a regulation excluding petrochemical recov-
ered oil from the definition of solid waste, "provided that certain
conditions are met."86 The D.C. Circuit, in API II, catalogued the
concerns of EPA regarding "sham recycling," as well as how some
extra materials, which could be hazardous, are added to the pe-
trochemical recovered oil.87 If these extra materials provide no
benefit to the "industrial process, EPA found this to be an act of
discard under the guise of recycling." 88 The Industry Petitioner,
Chemical Manufacturers' Association (hereinafter "CMA"), argued
that EPA could not regulate any of the petrochemical recovered oil
because these materials have not been "discarded."8 9 In presenting
this argument, CMA failed to attack the reasonableness of EPA's
conditions for exclusion. 90 The API II court, in turn, rejected
CMA's plain meaning argument under part one of the Chevron anal-
ysis by holding EPA was "correct that abandoning a material is dis-
carding even if labeled recycling." 91
Hypothetically, a refiner or manufacturer in a specific case
could go to great lengths to demonstrate that additional chemicals
in oil, for example, are not the product of "sham recycling" or adul-
85. See id. (noting AP I holding).
86. AP II, 216 F.3d at 58. Petrochemical recovered oil that is rendered haz-
ardous due to the presence of other hazardous materials, such as benzene, is ex-
cluded from the definition of solid waste. See id. EPA also wanted to decrease the
amount of sham recycling that occurred in the petroleum refining industry, such
as when "petrochemical recovered oil is 'speculatively accumulated before being
recycled into the petroleum refining process.'" Id.
87. See id. (stating ways in which process of shaming recycling is
consummated).
88. API II, 216 F.3d at 58. EPA's concerns about sham recycling are not base-
less. See id. According to the court in API II, EPA did not determine whether
"sham recycling" actually occurred in the petrochemical manufacturing industry.
See id. However, in API I EPA mentioned some samples of petrochemical recov-
ered oil were tested and showed contamination levels of namely "chlorinated or
other halogenated materials that were unexpected ...." Id.
89. See id. at 59 (stating CMA's argument that materials have not yet been
discarded).
90. See id., at 57 (stating reasonableness of EPA regulation not presented to
court).
91. Id. at 59 (citing part one of Chevron analysis).
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teration, therefore, are not discarded. 92 The D.C. Circuit in API I
did not consider such a scenario and dismissed CMA's claim.9 3
V. CRITIcAL ANALYSIS
EPA, in its capacity as a decision-making agency, is held to a
high standard for analyzing statutes and implementing costly regu-
lations. In extending a similar high bar to EPA's rationale for strict
regulations of oil-bearing wastewater and petrochemical recovered
oil, questions regarding their necessity have arisen. Considering the
cost and burden of EPA regulations in the petroleum refining in-
dustry, such a discussion is warranted.
A. District of Columbia Circuit's Inconsistencies Highlighted by
Industry Petitioners
The District of Columbia Circuit dealt with the different inter-
pretations of when a material is discarded for the purposes of the
solid waste under RCRA, as well as with maintaining congruency in
its ruling as the litigation progressed, especially with regard to AMC
J1 .94 The troubling outcome of the uncertain interpretation is far
reaching, resulting in costly EPA regulation of the petroleum refin-
ing industry.95 A fair reading of AMC II revealed that wastewater
treatment systems "are not part of ongoing industrial process,"
which is solid in its conception. 96 Taken in the context of API II,
however, AMC II is arguably outdated and inapplicable to EPA's
92. See id. (providing rebuttal to CMA's objections to samples relied upon by
EPA).
93. See Telephone Interview with Ralph J. Colleli,Jr., Senior Attorney, Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute (Sept. 7, 2000) (notes of interview available with author).
In a recent turn of events, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit is considering a rehearing on this particular matter. See id.
94. See API II, 216 F.3d at 54; for a corresponding discussion of API II in this
regard, see supra note 7, at 8,9 (documenting reasons AMC I controlled issues in
API H).
95. See State of the Petroleum Refining Industry: Hearing Before the Senate Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources, 106th Cong. 116 (1999) (citing Petroleum Industry
Environmental Performance Sixth Annual Report by the American Petroleum Institute
(citation omitted)) (illustrating expenses incurred by petroleum refining industry
companies related to compliance with RCRA regulations).
96. American Mining Cong. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1186 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (hereinafter "AMC II"). EPA does not explain its rationale as to why mineral
processing wastewater treatment systems and petroleum refinery wastewater sys-
tems were no different in the context of API II. See Brief for Respondent, supra
note 7, at 8. In fact, "there was no oil recovery component to the treatment systems
at issue in AMC I." Id.
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analysis.97 The materials under review in AMC II were not waste-
waters, but rather "mineral processing sludges held indefinitely in im-
poundments and which might someday be reclaimed."9 8  In
contrasting oil-bearing wastewaters, which are part of an ongoing
industry process, the difference in circumstances of these two cases
is stark.99
Another major factor that EPA addressed in its case in APII
was the location of the managed materials. 00 As articulated in
AMC II, the fact that the mineral sludges were managed in surface
impoundments played a crucial role in EPA's decision to regulate
the material in that case. 10 1 API I and the corresponding briefs
filed by the parties prior to the decision revealed that EPA asserted
it was troubled by "primary wastewater treatment" in surface im-
poundments. 10 2 Industry Petitioners distinguished EPA's logic with
AMC II by contending that primary treatment "typically occurs in
tanks, not surface impoundments."'10 3
The fact that EPA refused to acknowledge that legitimate re-
covery of oil occurs during the primary treatment process and is not
solely a pretext for compliance with the Clean Water Act is equally
troubling from a reasonableness standard - a standard necessitated
and required by a government agency in its regulatory capacity. 104
Industry Petitioners state that "petroleum refineries have been re-
covering oil from wastewater for economic efficiency reasons since
long before ... federal environmental laws."105 However, EPA and
97. SeeJoint Final Reply Brief of Petitioners at 9, American Petroleum Inst. v.
United States EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000) (arguing AMC 11
outdated for purposes of petroleum refining industry analysis).
98. Id. (holding out hope that materials may someday be reclaimed).
99. See id. (highlighting how oil-bearing wastewaters are part of continuous,
ongoing oil recovery process).
100. See id. (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 38,536, 38,537 (1994))(pointing out EPA ac-
knowledged primary treatment typically occurs in tanks).
101. See AMC 11, 907 F.2d at 1186-89 (discussing ramifications of treating was-
tewaters generated by primary smelting operations).
102. See Joint Final Reply Brief of Petitioners, supra note 97, at 9 (alleging
some of EPA's concerns in API H were misdirected).
103. Id. at 9 (permitting oil-water separation to be categorized with primary
treatment).
104. See API I, 216 F.3d at 58 (approximating 1,000 barrels of oil recovered
per day from primary treatment). For a further discussion of the nature of the
problem, see supra note 8 and accompanying text. But seeJoint Final Reply Brief
of Petitioners, supra note 99, at 10, n.8. For a more complete explanation of the
standard a governmental agency, such as EPA, is required to follow in its decision
making process, see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837, 842-44. For a further discussion of
the standard outlined here, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
105. Joint Final Reply Brief of Petitioners, supra note 99, at 10 (stating eco-
nomic reasons why refineries have been recovering wastewater).
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Industry Petitioners disagree about the quantity of oil that is actu-
ally recovered from primary treatment and estimates from sides
range from an insignificant amount to "considerable quantities of
oil-bearing materials."' 0 6 Industry Petitioners distinguish API H on
the fact that the recycling of mineral process wastes was in response
to mandatory waste treatment requirements. However, the petro-
leum refining industry has recovered oil "for economic efficiency
reasons" for quite some time, and therefore EPA's contention ap-
pears somewhat flawed.' 0 7
B. AMC I, Given Its Factual Backdrop, Should Control This Case
API I set forth the following facts in its primary brief submitted
to the court in AMC I:
A refinery is purposefully designed to recover as far as pos-
sible all materials through a complex retrieval system that
collects all refinable hydrocarbons and returns them to an
appropriate step in the refining process. For example,
many such hydrocarbons are collected through a vast net-
work of entrapment devices, drains and piping. Some of the
hydrocarbons collected are also captured from the wastewater treat-
ment system. Hydrocarbons captured from the wastewater system
are separated from the wastewater, then returned for processing.
The remaining material from the wastewater is discarded
in accordance with approved regulatory procedures. Only
such discarded material is 'solid waste' under the statutory
definition. 10 8
When juxtaposing the holding in the AMC I case against the "fac-
tual backdrop" provided above, was that "by regulating in-process
secondary materials, EPA has acted in contravention of Congress'
intent."' 0 9 Materials derived from the primary treatment of oil-
bearing wastewaters are an "in-process secondary material" and are
not solid wastes. 1 0 Industry Petitioners argued convincingly that
106. API II, 216 F.3d at 58 (providing debate between Industry Petitioners
and EPA regarding amount of oil recovered during primary treatment).
107. See id. (contending economic reasons for recovery of wastewater
underrated).
108. Joint Final Reply Brief of Petitioners at 29, American Petroleum Inst. v.
United States EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000).
109. Id. at 29-30 (arguing EPA bound to follow law of AMC 1). For a more
complete discussion of the facts and circumstances surrounding AMC II, see supra
notes 66-67 and accompanying tesxt.
110. Joint Brief of Petitioners, supra note 108, at 30.
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neither API, nor AMC II, trumped the law of AMC L Therefore,
AMC rs law should be the prevailing authority in API ILII
EPA countered with an interpretation of AMC I, notwithstand-
ing Industry Petitioners' argument. AMC I, contended EPA, em-
braced a narrow scope of materials, namely those that are "destined
for immediate reuse in another phase of the industry's ongoing pro-
duction process .... ,"112 EPA further claimed that AMC Hstood for
the proposition that even though the material at issue was eventu-
ally put back in its original industry process for reuse, the fact that
"before such time it is placed in wastewater treatment surface im-
poundments renders it discarded material, and hence solid
waste.""13 More specifically, EPA abruptly concluded that when cer-
tain steps of the petroleum refining process are finalized, the pro-
duction of petroleum is stopped. 114 Further, EPA contended the
enormous amounts of wastewater generated by the petroleum refin-
ing process are not mentioned as a part of the petroleum produc-
tion process, and therefore, this material must be classified as solid
waste.' 15
111. See id.; see generally, API I and AMC H (declining to change law crafted in
AMC 1).
112. Final Brief of Respondent at 21-22, American Petroleum Inst. v. United
States EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000) (citing AMC II, 907 F.2d at
1186 (emphasis in original; quoting AMC 1).
113. Final Brief of Respondent, supra note 112, at 22 (citing AMCII, 907 F.2d
at 1187); see also APII, 906 F.2d at 741 (stating K061 slag has become part of waste
disposal process); Owen Elec. Steel Co., 37 F.3d at 150 (ruling metal slag dis-
carded); United States v. Ilco, 996 F.2d at 1131 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding lead com-
ponents from spent batteries may be regulated); Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. EPA,
976 F.2d 2, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding hazardous substances must first be dis-
carded before recycling process).
114. See Final Brief of Respondent, supra note 112 at 22 (describing EPA's
version of production of petroleum without mention of primary treatment). The
reason why the petroleum refining industry engages in the primary treatment of
oil-bearing wastewaters is because CWA mandates that refineries remove oil from
their wastewater, "including specific requirements regarding the amount to be re-
moved." Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 419.12(a)). Further, the "certain steps of the petro-
leum refining process that EPA referred to were as follows: (1) the separation of
crude oil into various usable fractions and (2) the subsequent recovery of the frac-
tions through "distillation, fractionation and cracking towers as fuels, kerosene
and gasoline." Id. (citing AMCI, 824 F.2d at 1181). After these steps, EPA believes
that the production of petroleum is completed, which does not include primary
treatment. See id. For a more complete description of the primary treatment pro-
cess conducted by the petroleum refinery industry, see supra notes 6-7 and accom-
panying text.
115. See id. (focusing on sheer volume of wastewater).
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C. "Sham Recycling" Is a Front for EPA Regulation of
Petrochemical Recovered Oil
In API II, CMA confronted EPA about the Agency's decision to
regulate petrochemical recovered oil, by challenging EPA's asser-
tion that this recovered oil was solid waste. 116 CMA illustrated that
petrochemical recovered oil is not discarded or otherwise "dis-
posed, abandoned, or thrown away," as held in AMC L11 7 Con-
versely, instead of relying on the precedent, EPA maintained its
jurisdiction over the petrochemical recovered oil by invoking the
concept of sham recycling, which obviated the "discarded" material
analysis formulated by the AMC Icourt. 118 The goal of preventing
sham recycling can be achieved only through the regulation of non-
discarded materials.'1 19 AMC I held that "EPA possesses authority only
over oils that are discarded before recycling.' 120 The bottom line
argument is that petrochemical recovered oil is not discarded,
therefore, EPA's jurisdiction in this arena is innocuous.
EPA attempted to build upon the shaky foundation of its sham
recycling justification by contending that some petrochemical re-
covered oil is adulterated with listed hazardous wastes. 21 Among
the chemicals cited by the EPA were high levels of halogens in sam-
ples of petrochemical recovered oil. 1 22 As with EPA's previous ar-
gument, the Industry Petitioners refuted EPA allegations with
direct evidence. 123 First, they asserted that no evidence exists in the
record that "any petrochemical recovered oil is actually mixed with
116. SeeJoint Final Reply Brief of Petitioners at 3, American Petroleum Inst. v.
United States EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000) (retorting that pe-
trochemical recovered oil serves useful functions and should not be deemed solid
waste).
117. Id. (citing American Mining Cong. v. United States EPA, 824 F.2d 1177,
1193 (D.C. Cir. 1987))(showing how petrochemcially recovered oil is not
discarded).
118. SeeJoint Final Reply Brief of Petitioners at 3, supra note 116 (stressing
ramifications of EPA's shield of sham recycling to "sidestep" AMC I results in EPA
regulation of materials not discarded). More specifically, EPA claimed jurisdiction
to regulate non-discarded materials in order to "prevent disposal through [adulter-
ation]." Id.
119. See supra note 116, at 3 (stating "EPA is wrong") (emphasis in original).
120. Id. at 3-4 (emphasis in original) (attempting to establish parameters of
scope of EPA regulation).
121. See id. at 5. Further, EPA claimed that "sham recycling may occur if pe-
trochemical recovered oil is adulterated with [listed] hazardous waste, or hazard-
ous constituents" Id. (citing 62 Fed. Reg. 42,110, 42,129-30 (1998)).
122. SeeJoint Final Reply Brief of Petitioners at 5, American Petroleum Inst. v.
United States EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000) (refuting other ten-
ets of sham recycling).
123. See id., at 5-7 (stating EPA concerns over high levels of halogens are
unfounded).
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any listed hazardous wastes. EPA points to no such, evidence be-
cause none exists."'124 Second, some of the halogen concerns that
EPA cited are inherent products in the petroleum refinery as a
structure, not chemical manufacturing. 25 Many refineries use
crude oil, salt water and treated fresh water, "which may all contain
chloride - a halogen .... ,"126 Third, of the petrochemical samples
cited by EPA, some contained higher levels of halogens, while
others contained much lower levels, thus revealing inconsistencies
in EPA testing.127
D. EPA Rulings in Regard to Oil-Bearing Wastewaters Remain
Arbitrary and Capricious
Along with the sham recycling front created by EPA, Industry
Petitioners point out that EPA once declared that oil-bearing waste-
waters "simply have been discarded from the refining process," while at
the same time the Agency "admits that considerable quantities of
oil-bearing residuals may be recovered."' 28 The United States Su-
preme Court in Chevron clearly enunciated an analysis that must
apply to agency decision making.1 29 Finally, the record in API II is
void of a "rational or reasonable basis" for regulating in-process oil-
bearing wastewaters.' 30 Industry Petitioners characterize EPA's be-
havior as "irrational, self-serving ipse dixits [sic] . . . the essence of
arbitrary and capricious decision making." '31
VI. IMPACT
The possible implications of this decision are monumental.
The District of Columbia Circuit was correct in vacating the oil-
124. Id. (citing EPA's lack of evidence).
125. See id. (describing how halogens are inherent in petroleum refinery it-
self). Those materials mentioned in the text that are utilized by the petroleum
refineries, namely crude oil, salt water, and treated fresh water may contain chlo-
ride in "the form of dissolved sodium chloride (table salt)." Id. at 6.
126. Joint Final Reply Brief of Petitioners, supra note 125 and accompanying
text (containing Industry Petitioners' explanation for presence of halogens in
some petrochemical samples).
127. See id. (cataloging EPA inconsistencies in administration of tests regard-
ing levels of halogens).
128. Joint Brief of Petitioners at 31, American Petroleum Inst. v. United States
EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000) (citing EPA's admission that large
quantities of oil can be recovered from wastewaters).
129. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (laying out two step process for analyzing
agency interpretations of statutes).
130. Joint Brief of Petitioners at 32, American Petroleum Inst. v. United States
EPA, No. 94-1683 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 2000) (searching for reasons to regulate
in process oilbearing wastewaters).
131. Id. (characterizing EPA's regulation of wastewater).
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bearing wastewater portion of the API H opinion. 3 2 Under Chevron,
EPA failed to provide a reasonable explanation for its regulation of
oil-bearing wastewater under RCRA that Chevron requires.13  This
case represents an exposure of unwarranted EPA regulation on the
petroleum refining industry. It is not appropriate to continue sad-
dling the petroleum refining industry with unexplainable regula-
tions - the cost of which literally drives refineries out of
business.134
The impact of strict regulation of oil-bearing wastewaters by
EPA, without a rational explanation, is broad in scope. It is pro-
jected that the domestic production of oil will decline 1.1 percent
per year, totalling from 6.5 million barrels per day to 5.0 million
barrels per day in 2020.135 In fact, dependence on oil imports may
one day reach as high as sixty-five percent in 2020.136 This figure
approximately doubles the percentage of oil imported during the
energy crisis of the 1970s. 137 In the past 15 years, there has been no
new U.S. refineries built.'38 In addition, under this current regula-
tory climate, that trend will continue. 139 Furthermore, our coun-
132. See APIII, 261 F.3d at 58. For a further discussion of the necessary expla-
nations of Agency actions, see supra note 17 and accompanying text (providing
rationale of court's remand in oil-bearing wastewater portion of opinion).
133. For a discussion of the general framework for analyzing agency interpre-
tations of statutes see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
134. See Issues Affecting the Refining Sector of the Petroleum Industry: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., 102d Cong. 127(1999) (statements of
J.C. Klasing, General Manager, Environmental Affairs and Safety, AMOCO Oil
Company) (providing alarming impact statement of increased environmental regu-
lation on petroleum refining industry). This report cites costly compliance with
environmental regulation standards as a catalyst for petroleum refinery closures,
especially smaller refineries. See id. In fact, the amount of refineries in the United
States decreased from 319 to 194 facilities between 1980 and 1990. See id. Addi-
tionally, operational capacities of U.S. refineries decreased from 18.0 million bar-
rels to 15.6 million barrels a day between 1980 and 1990. See id.
135. See State of the Petroleum Industry: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy
and Natural Res., 106th Cong. 17 (1999) (statements of Senator Ken Conrad of
North Dakota). Further, to account for the difference between domestic supply
and demand, imports will grow between $100 billion and $158 billion in 2020. See
id.
136. See id. (stating possible impact of strict regulation of oil-bearing waste-
waters by EPA)
137. See id. (contrasting data from energy depleted era of 1970s).
138. See Issues Affecting the Refining Sector of the Petroleum Industry: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., supra note 134, at 127 (suggesting U.S.
refineries and jobs are being transported overseas due to harsh EPA regulatory
requirements).
139. See id. (stating building of new refineries will remain at standstill due to
harsh regulations).
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try's dependence on foreign oil "has a negative impact on our
nation's foreign policy."' 40
A more focal impact on the petroleum refining industry is EPA
extending its jurisdiction into the petroleum production process it-
self. 141 Many businesses produce unregulated residuals as a by-
product of production, and the Industry Petitioners in API H are
attempting to draw the line with EPA. 142 The Agency has yet to
produce a rational explanation of its regulation of oil-bearing
wastewaters. 
143
Perhaps equally important is the initial petition filed by CMA
in API !! regarding the regulation of petrochemical recovered oil by
EPA.1 44 The District of Columbia Circuit initially dismissed CMA's
claim in APIII;145 yet, as of September 2000, the same court is con-
sidering a rehearing on the matter.146 Some commentators believe
that due to the substantial burden on refineries to comply with EPA
regulations, 147 courts are taking rehearing requests more seri-
ously.148 Industry Petitioners are still projecting future budgets that
include astronomical compliance costs associated with EPA regula-
tions. 149 The D.C. Circuit has provided a glimmer of hope to Indus-
try Petitioners by requiring EPA to justify costly regulations more
effectively; as a result, a balance between capitalism and the protec-
tion of the natural environment may one day prevail. 150
Stuart O'Neal
140. State of the Petroleum Industry: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and
Natural Res., supra note 135, at 17 (elucidating traditional foreign policy objectives
that have been adversely affected by our nation's dependence on foreign oil such
as supporting democracy and supporting open economies and free trade).
141. See Telephone Interview with Ralph J. Colleli, Jr., supra note 93 (discuss-
ing impacts of EPA regulation).
142. See id. (suggesting that regulation of oil-bearing wastewaters is not
necessary).
143. See generally, API II, 261 F.3d at 50 supra note 17 and accompanying text.
144. See id. at 59 (citing importance of CMA's petition to petrochemical refin-
ing industry).
145. Id. (stating procedural history of API I).
146. See Telephone Interview with Ralph J. Colleli, Jr., supra note 93 (outlin-
ing concerns of petroleum refining industry in context of strict EPA regulations
under RCRA).
147. See id. (suggesting burden on refineries to comply with EPA regulations
has had impact on courts).
148. See Landry supra note 41, at 2 (describing reasons for rehearing consider-
ation by District of Columbia Circuit).
149. See id. (projecting impact EPA regulations will have in future).
150. See generally, API II, 261 F.3d at 50. For a further discussion of AP[ 1I see
supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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